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Ciencia sêm Fronteiras was one of the largest academic exchange 
programs in the early 2010s, enabling almost 100,000 Brazilian 
researchers to undertake partial research or entire degrees abroad. As 
a major element of Dilma Rousseff’s international engagement, the 
program was often cited in the context of Brazil’s soft power. But very 
little research has been done on how Ciencia sêm Fronteiras 
contributed to Brazil’s soft power reservoir. This article examines the 
program from an institutional perspective, and analyzes why the 
program has come short in living up to its soft power potential. 
 
Resumo 
Ciencia sêm Fronteiras foi um dos maiores programas de intercâmbio 
acadêmico no início da década de 2010, permitindo que quase 100.000 
pesquisadores brasileiros realizassem pesquisas parciais ou inteiras no 
exterior. Como um elemento importante do envolvimento internacional 
do governo de Dilma Rousseff, o programa foi frequentemente citado 
no contexto do soft power do Brasil. Mas muito pouca pesquisa foi feita 
sobre como o programa Ciencia sêm Fronteiras contribuiu para 
aumentar o soft power do Brasil. Este artigo examina o programa de 
uma perspectiva institucional e analisa os problemas que acabaram 
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In the early 2000s, several analysts commented on the rise of the BRICS (O’Neil, 2001) 
– Brazil, India, China, and sometimes South Africa –; countries with growing or emerging 
markets that would gain power and eventually challenge the world order of the era (Hurrell, 
2006; Sotero and Armijo, 2007; “The Globalization Index,” 2006; Wilson and 
Purushothaman, 2003). While those hopes did not fully materialize for the BRICS, with the 
exception of China, Brazil in particular had a remarkable run until its economy crashed in 
2014 and remained in recession for almost two years, and the subsequent domestic political 
turmoil erupted. 
From the now famous Christ-the-redeemer statue taking off on the Economist cover in 
2009 (“Brazil takes off”) to the same statue falling from the sky in 2013 (“Has Brazil blown 
it?”), Brazil drew attention to itself in the foreign policy and international investment circles 
of the early 21st century. In Foreign Policy’s final edition of 2009, David Rothkopf called 
President Luis Inázio (Lula) da Silva’s Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (and later Dilma 
Rousseff’s Defense Minister) “The World’s best Foreign Minister” (Rothkopf, 2009). The rise 
of Brazil was in many cases attributed to sophisticated negotiation skills and Amorim’s 
foreign policy that put soft power at its center (Glasser, 2010). 
When Dilma Rousseff looked at redefining the future direction of Brazilian foreign 
policy before her re-election as president in 2014, it was significant that, unlike her mentor 
and predecessor, she was rather uninterested in international affairs (Sabatini, 2015). In any 
case, questions surrounding the approach that this president would choose for Brazil’s 
international posture remained widely unanswered. Some pointed towards the growing 
economy of Latin America’s most populous and geographically largest country, and saw 
Brazil as a regional power to come (Bethell, 2010). Other more optimistic commentators 
hoped for an increase of its share in world trade, as well as its role as a rule setter through 
Brazil’s engagement in UN missions (Stuenkel et al., 2013) and within the frameworks of G-
20 financial regulation after the 2008 financial crisis (Beeson and Bell, 2009) or the increasing 
global presence of the BRICS countries (Lowe, 2016).  
All these indicators, however, only described one side of Brazil’s increasing power. 
This type of traditional power may best be classified as “hard power” (Nye, 1990, p.156). On 
the other hand, a number of political commentators credit Brazil as being particularly 
capable of applying a foreign policy strategy that is based on what Harvard Political 
Scientist Joseph Nye has termed “soft power” (Lee and Gómez, 2011). 
Facing a lack of traditional hard power resources, Brazil was able to portray itself as 
a soft power powerhouse. And for many years, Brazil shaped the discourse around its 
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international engagement in this way – especially with the intellectual underpinning of 
international scholars and Brazilian diplomats turned academics. This included, among 
others, the perception of the country within the international community and its power to 
persuade, rather than coerce, when it comes to international arbitration. The images of Brazil 
that include the Carnival of Rio or tropical beaches as well as events such as the FIFA World 
Cup in 2014 and the Summer Olympics in 2016 – although critically reviewed at the time – 
contribute to Brazil continuously ranking in the top-30 of the Anholt Nation Brands Index 
(Ipsos, 2018), a top-30 to top-20 spot in Monocle’s Soft Power Index (“Soft Power,” 2019), 
and its appearance in Portland’s Soft Power 30 index since 2015 (Portland Communications 
and University of Southern California, n.d.). While critique is appropriate when it comes to 
the robustness and meaning of these indicators, they are a reflection of the importance of 
perception and image, as well as factors of influence beyond military and economic might, 
that play a role in international affairs (see e.g. Buarque, 2019). 
Beyond journalistic writing, Brazil’s soft power has only appeared in a handful of 
academic studies, e.g. Chatin, who concludes that Brazil presents itself as a soft power 
broker despite “some discrepancy between objectives and accomplishments” (Chatin, 2016, 
p.384); Diniz et al., who analyze Brazil’s approaches to cyber-regulation through a soft 
power prism (Diniz et al., 2014); or, Lustig, who focusses on discourse when looking at 
Brazil’s neighborhood policies (Lustig, 2016). Bry critically assesses Brazil’s soft power 
discourse of “solidarity” within the South-South context: in the work, Brazil scores highly 
due to its strong track record of fighting both poverty and HIV, but also faces the risks of 
losing its soft power credentials by increasingly focussing on economic interests (Bry, 2016, 
p.311). 
One of the programs that Brazil was much applauded for is the “Ciencia sêm 
Fronteiras” (Science without Borders - CsF) program for academic exchange. This program 
was often used as an example of Brazil’s soft power, however, the question of whether this 
particular program contributed to Brazil’s soft power capabilities in any meaningful way is 
yet to be addressed. Drawing from relevant theories, as well as similar but more successful 
examples, in this case Germany’s Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), will help to analyse 
Brazil’s CsP and identify best practices when it comes to exerting soft power through 
academic exchange. 
 
Research Question  
A crucial question within the concept of soft power is how states can actively and 
successfully increase their resources. In contrast to hard power resources, where a country 
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can increase economic output and thereby military procurement, soft power relies on a 
multitude of under-researched factors. 
One source for soft power are institutions and interdependence within institutions 
and between countries (Nye, 1990, p.168). On the other hand, there are soft power resources 
that are based on public and political perception (Nye, 2008, p.96). These require policy 
makers to combine a number of instruments beyond the typical administrative toolkit to 
advance a country’s standing in the global community. Besides the public relations 
measures that policy makers might rely on, one of the concrete tools to enhance soft power 
based on perception lies in exchange programs for both future leaders and academics 
(Enfield, 2019, p.2). This is the focus of the present article. 
As Brazil looked to meet the increasing demand of its growing economy for highly-
skilled workers, the governments of both Presidents Lula and Dilma Roussef expanded the 
higher education (HE) sector (OECD, 2019, p.2), while the latter implemented a number of 
initiatives for academic exchange with large funds allocated to programs like CsF, one of 
the biggest academic exchange program in the world, established in 2011 and concluded in 
2015, with graduation dates up until 2019/20 (CAPES, 2013a). Besides Brazil’s material 
interest in educating its workforce and transfering skills from abroad, might there have been 
a deliberate soft power component to CsF? And if so, what were the factors that influenced 
the soft power posture of the program? 
The following article aims to identify whether or not Brazil’s CsF program served as 
a soft power foreign policy tool, and why. The analysis will focus on both the program itself 
and the institutional setup that allowed it to be integrated into foreign policy strategy. 
 
Structure of the Article 
In order to address the questions posed above, this paper first examines the literature 
regarding academic exchange and soft power. Subsequently, there will be a brief literature 
review of existing work on CsF and soft power. The CsF program will be the focus of the 
next section, with dedicated subsections on the two funding bodies overseeing the program: 
the Federal Agency for Support and Evaluation of Graduate Education (CAPES) of the 
Ministry of Education of Brazil, and the National Council for Scientific and Technological 
Development (CNPq), a public foundation linked to the Brazilian Ministry of Science, 
Technology, and Innovation. In a final section, Germany’s Academic Exchange Service 
(DAAD) is presented as a model for soft power streamlining of HE exchange institutions. 
This paper develops a case study of CsF following the approach outlined by Gerring 
(2004). It is based on an institutional analysis (following the work of Greif, 1998, and the 
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IAD framework by Ostrom, 2011) of the CsF program, based on extensive desk/literature 
research and complemented with expert interviews for background information and 
validation. While caution is warranted when assuming the generalisability of single case 
studies, the value lies in generating qualitative data on the one hand, and inducting 
hypothesis on the other (Gerring, 2011).  
The article finds that the funding bodies are linked to Brazilian high-level policy 
making and therefore should be able to drive Brazilian foreign policy making, but that in 
this particular role, lacked central political coordination. In this way, the efficacy of CsF in 
realizing its potential as a foreign policy tool of soft power was limited. 
 
Soft Power and Academic Exchange 
As the creator of the concept, Joseph Nye, states, soft power is: “the ability to get what 
you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the 
attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies”(Nye, 2005, p.11). There 
has been notable criticism of the concept, particularly regarding the lack of a clear definition 
(Layne, 2010) and the resulting “lack of empirical scrutiny” (Nisbett, 2016), i.e. the difficulty 
of measuring soft power and its effects. Nonetheless, a lot of the most recent research is 
making significant progress towards a higher degree of formalization of the concept (most 
notably, Ohnesorge, 2020). On the normative side of critique, as posited by Nisbett (2016), 
is the view that soft power is not a force for change, but rather a function of the established 
structures that reproduce existing oppression. While this is a valid a problem, he argues, it 
should be addressed elsewhere. 
It is widely accepted that academic exchange increases a country’s soft power 
potential, such as in the 2019 report of the British Council on soft power (MacDonald, 2019). 
Yet, the question of how this particular mechanism works is rarely asked. The assumptions 
in this case are rooted in the concept of cultural diplomacy (Holden, 2013), which can be 
understood as a subset of public diplomacy and a strategy to increase a country’s soft power.  
Interestingly, from a HE perspective, soft power can often translate into greater 
attractiveness for incoming international students and researchers, which in turn increases 
the level of soft power, as demonstrated in a HE consulting firm’s 2016 report 
(GrantThornton, 2016). Ogunnubi and Shawa stress the difference between cultural, public, 
and knowledge diplomacy (Ogunnubi and Shawa, 2017, p.87), which provides useful 
insight for analyzing specific policy decisions within the realm of foreign policy analysis, 
though this broader debate should not distract from the focus of this paper. Similarly, Arroz 
and Mendoça introduce “science diplomacy” in the Brazilian context (Arroz and Mendonça, 
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2016), understanding it as a three-legged concept that allows a country to gain access to 
expertise, promote its own system, and gain influence abroad through the personal 
networks that can be developed through science (Arroz and Mendonça, 2016, p.129). 
Returning to Nye, the first part of his concept, the attractiveness of a country’s 
culture, can be connected to exchange programs and the personal experiences people on 
exchange have. These experiences, and exchange programs in general, bring us into the field 
of “public diplomacy,” a foreign policy tool that targets the public of a country rather than 
its diplomatic service or government officials (Nye, 2008, p.100). 
Before asking how soft power resources might be generated through public 
diplomacy strategy, we should first assess the nature of this relationship between 
individuals and their experiences with other countries and how this might impact foreign 
policy in the long term. Since “culture is transmitted […] through personal contacts, visits, 
and exchanges,” (Nye, 2009, p.13) it is possible to assess and potentially rank the impact of 
certain programs, or even certain groups’ experience of foreign policy. The literature shows 
that, in terms of soft power, the impact of academic exchange in a host country has a 
stronger effect than experiences of a touristic nature – even though the latter accounts for 
higher absolute numbers (Seong-Hun, 2018, p.8). It lies in the nature of academia that “many 
of these former students [that studied abroad] eventually wind up in positions where they 
can affect policy outcomes that are important” (Nye, 2009, p.45). This important point, 
understanding HE exchanges as an investment in personal networks that pay dividens once 
the graduates of exchange programs become local leaders, will later play an important role 
in the assessment of CsF. 
Nye’s assessment of the impact of the US HE sector can arguably be applied to most 
countries where exchange students can engage with and immerse themselves in local 
language, society, and culture. Although the experience gained from participating in 
academic exchange might not always be positive, Ohnesorge (2020, p.89) stresses that soft 
power depends on the reception by the respective partner. Yet, in international relations, 
one might argue that building friendships is not always what is at stake. As the saying goes: 
states do not have friends, they have interests. A far more important factor in international 
relations lies in the stability and predictability of a country’s partners. The ability to 
understand a foreign culture through immersion, whether a positive experience or not, adds 
to the highly sought after ability to make predictions in the context of international politics.  
This idea follows the argument that while international educational exchange plays 
a role in inter-cultural communication, it is difficult to argue how this should influence a 
country’s international posture or the perception thereof (Lima, 2007, p.234).  
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In his comprehensive study on soft power, Ohnesorge (2020, p.89) explicitely 
subsumes “exchange diplomacy” under public diplomacy, as one of the instruments of soft 
power. This means that, through academic exchange, a country can elicit a reaction from an 
international counterpart. These reactions are then shaped by the perception of the recipient, 
which might be attraction, apathy, or repulsion, which, respectively, will lead to either 
compliance, neutrality, or opposition (Ohnesorge, 2020, p.89). 
Since HE “enables and fosters authentic [...] engagement, exchange and collaboration 
at the individual, institutional and community level” (Byrne and Hall, 2013, p.425), it 
contributes to a country’s international reputation, and the connection between the impact 
on the personal level and the overall impact on foreign relations becomes evident. A further 
institutional aspect of the attractiveness of international HE can be seen in global university 
rankings, which amplify the effect that HE exchange has on foreign relations, creating a 
virtuous circle.  
Furthermore, relationships formed through personal exchange are not limited to an 
abstract idea of mutual understanding. Such relationships help develop stronger and long-
lasting ties between countries, be it through tourism, trade, or politics. Hence,  
 
positive experiences and exchanges (both in-country and offshore), and the 
development of intellectual, commercial and social relationships can build upon a 
nation’s reputation, attractiveness and ability to participate in and potentially 
influence regional or even global outcomes. This is ultimately the essence of soft 
power (Byrne and Hall, 2011, p.5). 
 
We can see how exchange in general, and HE exchange in particular, can inform the 
perception of a given country abroad and lead to a self reinforcing mechanism of enhanced 
collaboration through tourism, trade, and subsequently political transactions. With its 
ability to include both current and future elites, HE exchange should be able to play a central 
role in creating leadership networks that translate into long-term soft power resources. 
Ziguras points out that the “projection of soft power remains a primary imperative 
shaping the international education strategies of most governments” (Ziguras, 2018, p.174), 
however, that it focuses on the value of incoming students to the perception of a country. In 
the case of Canada, for example, the country “chose not to establish a centralized 
organization such as the United States Information Agency, UK's British Council, German's 
DAAD and Goethe Institutes, EduFrance and the network of Alliance Franchise, The 
Netherlands's NUFFIC, or the Japan Foundation” (Trilokekar, 2010, p.132). Rather, it 
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directly linked their international education programs with the department of foreign affairs 
(Lo, 2011, p.216). Ogunnubi and Shawa similarly point to Fulbright, British Council, DAAD, 
China’s Confucius Institutes, and the European Union’s Erasmus Mundus programs as 
prominent examples of soft power in higher education (Ogunnubi and Shawa, 2017, p.87). 
Through the soft power prism, attracting foreign academics appears to be a winning 
strategy, as it allows countries to directly influence the (future) elites of others’. Through the 
active creation of alumni networks, Fulbright, British Council, and DAAD maintain links 
with respective partner countries and thereby keep lines of influence open – a material 
manifestation of soft power. 
In the literature surrounding the nexus between soft power and HE, there has been a 
strong emphasis on attracting foreign students and researchers to one’s country, with only 
a few notable exceptions. China’s export of HE to Africa forms part of the country’s South-
South development cooperation and has gained the attention of certain researchers (King, 
2013). Similarly, South Africa understands domestic education policy explicitly in the 
context of gaining regional leadership and increasing its soft power reservoir (Ogunnubi 
and Shawa, 2017, p.83).  
It is widely accepted that “education has also emerged as an effective tool for 
countries to project their influence globally, promoting their reputation and social, cultural 
and political values” (Manjang, 2017, p.92). To address the fact that this notion and the 
mechanisms behind it have not been sufficiently examined, this paper focuses on the rather 
uncommon case (in terms of soft power and HE research) of Brazil’s efforts to send domestic 
students abroad. 
We have seen what soft power means in the context of international relations, as well 
as how it connects to public diplomacy, a policy tool to increase soft power. International 
education as part of public diplomacy “is of increasing importance as an instrument that 
can build and leverage soft power to facilitate a nation’s long-term strategic positioning” 
(Byrne and Hall, 2011, p.2). And, since this intellectual exchange affects the respective elites, 
“one or two key contacts may have a major political effect”, ultimately leading to effective 
networks of influence. 
The ability to use educational exchange as a tool of public diplomacy to increase soft 
power relies on a conscious coordination strategy. In the Brazilian context, it is unclear 
whether the implementation of a major program of academic exchange like CsF was actually 
created as a possible resource for soft power, and if so, whether this potential was exploited 
by the federal government in a coordinated manner. 
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Literature on Soft Power and Ciencia sêm Fronteiras 
Surprisingly, little work has been published on Brazil’s CsF program and its potential 
contribution to soft power. While several articles briefly mention CsF as an example of 
Brazilian soft power, there has not been any substantive work done on the actual effect of 
CsF on, or its potential for, soft power. The only study available is a thesis by Martos (2014), 
which points out that through CsF, Brazil can present itself as both wealthy and interested 
in overseas education (Martos, 2014, p.25). 
Most literature focuses on the institutional set-up of foreign policy making at the 
ministerial level. The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs – also called Itamaraty – has been 
subject to a plethora of studies by predominantly Brazilian academics. When Presidents 
Lula and Dilma Rousseff put an active focus on cultural diplomacy, the “Itamaraty Cultural 
Department [was] organised in five units covering the promotion of: language; culture and 
cultural exchange; Brazilian cinema, television production and advertising; Brazilian policy 
and news; international liaison on culture with multilateral bodies; and international 
education.” (MacDonald, 2019, p.14) Notably, academic exchange was not covered by this 
or any other departments at Itamaraty. For the sake of CsF, Itamaraty had to partner up 
with Brazil’s Ministry of Education (MEC) and the Ministry of Science, Technology, and 
Innovation (MCTI) – an unusual set-up for the traditionally highly centralized foreign policy 
in Brazil (ibid). 
Miranda and Bischoff focus on the presidential angle of international education in 
Brazil’s foreign policy toolkit (Miranda and Bischoff, 2018). They convincingly show that, at 
the presidential level, soft aspects of the program were not understood, while the focus 
remained exclusively with the material benefits of creating a highly qualified and 
internationally educated workforce within the remit of Brazil’s domestic posture as a 
developmental state. Given this apparent lack of research on the role of CsF in Brazilian soft 
power, the following paragraphs aim shed light on the topic. 
 
Ciencia sêm Fronteiras: General Considerations 
In addition to pre-existing bilateral scientific cooperation (e.g. with China or 
Germany), in 2011, the Brazilian government launched CsF as a major program for 
international academic exchange. Schulz sees CsF as a logical development of Brazil’s 
ongoing expansion into the global spheres of culture and education (Schulz, 2018, p.77). 
According to the official description (CAPES, 2013a), CsF was a federal government 
program that sought to promote the consolidation, expansion, and internationalization of 
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science and technology, innovation, and Brazilian competitiveness through the exchange of 
undergraduates and postgraduates, as well as international mobility.  
CsF was set up to provide up to 75,000 stipends from the federal government and an 
additional 26,000 stipends from private investors between the years of 2011 and 2015 
(Martos, 2014, p. 16). The initiative was the result of cooperation between the Ministry of 
Science, Technology, and Innovation (MCTI) and the Ministry of Education (MEC), through 
their respective funding agencies, CNPq and CAPES, and the department of Higher 
Education and Technological Education of the MEC.  
In addition to these mobility funds for Brazilians to go abroad, a small part of the 
privately funded resources “provide[d] incentives - start-up funds and fellowships - for out-
of-country scientists to move to Brazil, whether in the academic, governmental, or industrial 
sector” (Garcia et al., 2012, p.1127). 
The list of so-called “priority areas” of CsF excluded the humanities and social 
sciences; the main focus was on technology, natural sciences, and innovation, including 
engineering and other technology areas, earth sciences, biology, biomedical and health 
sciences, IT, aerospace technology, pharmaceutical research, sustainable agricultural 
production oil, gas and renewable energy, biotechnology, and nanotechnology, among 
others (Ciencia sem Fronteiras, 2013a).  
The direction of the program becomes clearer when one looks at one of the possible 
clusters for applicants: “creative industries.” Despite the perception that this might expand 
the potential candidate pool, further reading reveals that even these proposals had to be 
focused on products and processes for technological development and innovation, thereby 
limiting the scope of eligible fields. 
Hence, this seemingly open cluster restricted the pool of likely applicants. Since 
current (and past) leaders of society in Brazil are mainly educated in law or business 
(Hummel, 2013), one can conclude that the program did not aim at creating informal 
networks for the future political leaders of the country, but rather served to educate and 
train the much-needed highly skilled work force – a political goal in line with the 
developmental model that the Brazilian state followed during the PT government (Saad-
Filho and Morais, 2018). This differs from academic exchange programs such as the U.S.’s 
Fulbright program or Germany’s DAAD program, both of which are of similar ambition but 
also allow applicants from all disciplines. With the additional disciplines and the active 
fostering of alumni organizations, this results in networks not only for highly-skilled 
professionals and academics, but also for future leaders – a policy more in line with the 
pursuit of soft power. 
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The CsF program had 27 designated partner countries, consisting of 15 EU countries 
(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) plus the 
USA, Canada, China, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, South Korea, 
Switzerland, and Ukraine (Ciencia sem Fronteiras, 2016a). Institutions in these countries 
allowed for simplified application procedures, but candidates were also allowed – though 
not explicitely encouraged – to propose exchanges with countries not on the list. The 
proposals had to be approved by the selection committee, which judged the merit and 
necessity of the respective project. The burden was therefore significantly higher for those 
applying outside the partner countries, which likely led to a significantly higher share of 
scholarship holders indicating these countries as their intended destinations. The number 
of awarded scholarships confirm the preference for CsF partner countries. The 27 partner 
countries account for over 84,000 of the 91,500 scholoarships awarded, with the US (27,810) 
and the UK (10,740) at the top of the ranking, while Australia (7,074) counts for almost all of 
the non-partner country scholarships (Ciencia sem Fronteiras, 2016b). It is equally 
noteworthy that there was barely any demand for Brazil’s political partners, e.g. from the 
BRICS grouping or Latin American and Mercosur partners. 
One of the CsF’s objectives was to increase the competitiveness of Brazilian 
companies, so the program was designed with a focus on technology and innovation 
(Ciencia sem Fronteiras, 2013b). Companies with their own research centers or partnerships 
with other institutions were able to apply to support the program, either within Brazil or in 
a host country, through funding stipends. The financing companies worked together with 
the CNPq and CAPES in order to support and complement the CsF program, enabling the 
training of professionals and researchers in universities, as well as vocational and 
technological education. For these firms, the appeal of participating in the CsF program was 
the ability to send their workers abroad for highly specialized and high-quality training 
which was potentially unavailable in Brazil.  
At the same time, the formation of research centers of excellence between private 
companies and universities allowed these companies to attract visiting academic 
researchers from abroad to their facilities. This was intended to create synergies between 
academic research and applied, industry-based research and implementation, as well as to 
facilitate knowledge transfer between young talent from Brazil and highly qualified 
researchers from abroad (CAPES, 2013b). 
Of the ten companies mentioned on the program website, attention should be drawn 
to Petrobras and Eletrobras. The involvement of these two state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
could suggest greater governmental influence on the program than what is publicly 
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acknowledged. It is unclear whether Petrobras or Eletrobras representatives in the selection 
committee of the CsF were politically appointed, which might allow for shaping the 
program from within government (e.g. from within the president’s or foreign office) in order 
to build soft power resources.  
In order to further explore the ability of the Brazilian government to exert influence 
on the CsF program, we now turn to the two entities that execute the program, CAPES and 
CNPq. Both organizations have strong ties with politics; however, in both cases, political 
influence is equally difficult to trace. 
 
CAPES 
The “Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior” (CAPES) is a 
foundation set up by the Federal Ministry of Education (MEC) that supervises and 
consolidates postgraduate education in Brazil. The foundation has not always been in as 
strong of a position as it is today. In fact, the history of CAPES is quite turbulent. It was first 
introduced as a government agency of MEC in 1951, turned over to presidential control in 
1961, before returning to the scope of MEC in 1964. In 1974, the structure of CAPES was 
changed and it received the status of a "central body top, enjoying financial and 
administrative autonomy” (CAPES, 2013b). In 1990, President Collor tried to close CAPES, 
but after a wave of mobilization and with the support of MEC, CAPES was reinstated less 
than two months after the attempt. It is understandable that the president of such an 
internally competitive government would try to shut down such a politically strong and 
independent institution in order to consolidate power.  
At the beginning of 1992, the new and current organization of CAPES was put into 
effect by Law Nr. 8405, which allowed the government to reorganize CAPES as a public 
foundation under the auspices of MEC (Brazil, 1992). Despite CAPES’ tendencies towards 
more autonomy and its formal independence in decision-making, the ties between politics 
and CAPES remain close. An example for this “revolving door” between politics and science 
in the light of science policy is the long-term (2004-2015) president of CAPES, Jorge Almeida 
Guimarães, who held his position for the duration of the workers’ party (PT) governments. 
He served as national secretary of political strategy and scientific development in the 
Ministry of Education from 2002 until 2004. 
 
Figure 1: Budget of CAPES 2004-2020. 
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Source: CAPES (CAPES, 2020); author’s own visualization. 
 
Figure 1 shows a significant and continuous increase in the budget of CAPES until 
Brazil’s financial crisis in 2014/15, which suggests a strong buy-in from the political decision-
making level. At the same time, the fact that the administrative share of CAPES’ budget 
remained fairly stable over the period does not suggest that the institution developed a 
strong self-serving agenda. 
As early as 2007, CAPES created an international relations department and a 
department specifically dedicated to scholarships for Brazilians to study abroad. Since 
international cooperation in the Brazilian academic sector had previously been based on 
bilateral treaties, the ability of CAPES to shape policy within a multi-lateral exchange 
context should not be underestimated. The uncertainty of this new framework gives CAPES 
an increased space within which to operate and shape science and education policy.  
Within the realm of CAPES, exchange agreements that qualify for funding can either 
be set up on a bilateral basis between universities or be based on bilateral treaties at the 
national level (Schulz, 2018, p.117). CsF can then become a line of funding for those 
agreements. For future research, it would be worthwhile to collect, aggregate, and analyze 
the data of all CsF scholarships with respect to their type of agreement. 
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The lack of direct institutional ties, however, between CAPES and the president’s 
office (especially given the changes in institutional set-up in the past) suggests that CAPES 
is not strategically involved in the government’s work when it comes to using academic 
exchange as tool to acquire soft power. The lack of ties between CAPES and Itamaraty only 
further reinforces this point. The CsF program, as administered by CAPES, lacks the clear 
political motivation present in similar academic exchange programs of other countries (e.g. 
Fulbright or DAAD).  
 
CNPq 
The Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq) can be 
viewed as the Ministry of Science and Technology’s (MCTI) counterpart to CAPES. It was 
founded in 1951, in order to develop policy strategies in the fields of science, technology, 
and innovation – mainly the development of nuclear technology in Brazil. CNPq remained 
a government agency under the auspices of the Ministry of Technology until the end of 2002.  
When it was first founded, the main task of CNPq was to coordinate Brazil’s nuclear 
policy and development. Its mission, therefore, was, and is, more openly political than that 
of CAPES (Grabendorff, 1987, p.531). In 1964, the task of formulating policy strategies was 
formally incorporated into CNPq’s mission. From 1974-1985, CNPq was subordinated to the 
Secretariat of Planning within the presidential administration and was stripped of much of 
its autonomy (Schwartzman, 1994, p. 448). With the creation of the Ministry for Technology 
in 1985, CNPq was linked to this new actor after a request by the scientific community to 
gain more autonomy at ministerial level.  
This change in the mission of CNPq brought more liberties and autonomy into its 
work. Still, the political connections remain: the regulations of CNPq state that its president, 
deputy-president, and three directors must be appointed by the president of Brazil (Dias 
and Serafim, 2011). Furthermore, the executive board of CNPq includes a state-secretary of 
the Ministry of Technology. The presidential administration has a close eye on the decisions 
of both the executive board and the executive directorate. At CNPq, international relations 
and the funding of outgoing researchers is directly overseen by the presidency of the 
organization (Schulz, 2018, p.93). 
Closer inspection of CNPq’s work shows that the CNPq acts primarily as an expert 
body in advising the Brazilian government. Many of the policies implemented by the 
administration are based on recommendations of the CNPq. On the other hand, CNPq does 
implement government policy in certain areas. For instance, in an online interview, the 
former head of CNPq admitted to working towards modernizing the Brazilian university 
Froehlich, Thomas. Brazil’ “Ciencia sêm Fronteiras” Program and Soft Power. 
 
      RASILIANA: Journal for Brazilian Studies. ISSN 2245-4373. Vol. 9 No. 1 (2020). 
- 510 - 
system – in line with government policy - against the preferences of the universities’ 
bureaucracies (Oliva, 2015). 
It is noteworthy that this scientific-academic advisory council is led by political 
appointees. Returning to the question of how this affects Brazilian opportunities to 
transform the CsF program into a tool of acquiring soft power resources, it also seems that, 
despite the close connection with MCTI and the dependence of the executive personnel on 
a presidential decision, the CNPq generally develops an autonomous agenda and pursues 
it. The historical relationship and mission statement of the CNPq both point to this. The 
same may be said of parts of the government within the MCTI. Therefore, the institutional 
design of the CNPq and its involvement in the CsF do not suggest any potential for the 
coordination of a soft power strategy. 
Moreover, an initial lack of adequate funding for the administration of CsF grants, 
coupled with the fact that there was a lack of coordination between CAPES and CNPq, 
means that the uptake of the program was significantly delayed (Aveiro, 2014, p.8), making 
a strategic use of the program seem less likely. 
Having examined the implementing bodies of CsF - CAPES and CNPq -, it becomes 
clear that its institutional set-up was not adequate to facilitate the program as a tool of soft 
power. The organizational distance between the implementing bodies and Brazil’s foreign 
policy making bodies, Itamaraty and the office of the President, complicated the possibility 
of embedding CsF into any foreign policy strategy, in particular into a complex mechanism 
of soft power.  
To continue the debate on how, exactly, a country might indeed incorporate academic 
exchange into its soft power foreign policy strategy, the following paragraphs outline how 
Germany approaches HE exchange in a more politically guided manner. 
 
HE exchange as soft power tool: Germany’s academic exchange politics 
Germany’s flagship institution for academic public diplomacy, the German 
Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), was originally founded in 1925 and thereby reflects 
the importance that this kind of foreign policy has played in Germany’s Grand Strategy over 
the past century. In its current form, DAAD was re-founded in 1950, and since then has 
financed around 2.5 million scholarships, with about 1.5 million scholarships for Germans 
and roughly 1 million for foreigners – making it the largest funding body for academic 
exchange worldwide (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), 2020, p.10). 
DAAD is embedded into a network of German institutions that address cultural diplomacy, 
among them the Goethe Institutes, which are dedicated to promoting the German language 
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in close cooperation with the German Foreign Office (Lanshina, 2015, p.87), the Alexander 
von Humboldt-Foundation, and the Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen (Institute for Foreign 
Relations) (Felknerová, 2014, p. 81). This coordinated German Foreign Cultural and 
Educational Policy falls in the remit of the German Foreign Office, which employs an entire 
division to coordinate policies within the broader framework of German foreign policy 
(Adick, 2016, p.15). 
DAAD’s budget, which in 2019 stood at just under 600 million EUR (Deutscher 
Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), 2020, p. 144), is funded by the German Foreign 
Office (35%), the German Ministry for Education and Research (25%), the German Ministry 
for Economic Copperation and Development (10%), and the European Union (23%). This 
breakdown of the funding sources makes it clear that exchange diplomacy is regarded as an 
importrant tool of German foreign policy and is political in nature. The aspect of developing 
capabilities (ie., the developmental state) can be understood as a side effect, which is also 
represented in the smaller share of funding that the German Ministry of Education and 
Research bears in the overall funding structure. 
While representatives of Germany’s scientific organizations form part of DAAD’s 
governing body, the organization’s board is strongly influenced by the representatives of 
the constituting ministries, each delegating one representative to the board. This enables 
DAAD to shift geographic preferences in target countries according to geopolitical 
necessities, as well as to streamline funding priorities in line with the activities of Germany’s 
other institutions of cultural diplomacy. 
Finally, DAAD’s motto, “change by exchange”, and its expliciut goal to “educate 
future leaders, who are connected internationally and act in a globally responsible manner,” 
(DAAD, 2020) illustrates the genuinely political mission of the organisation. This is 
emphasized by the active creation of alumni networks and incentives to regularly return to 
Germany for alumni meetings. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Unlike the beginning of the 20th century, when the iconic Brazilian Foreign Minister, 
the Baron of Rio Branco, celebrated intellectual exchange and used, for example, the Third 
Latin American Congress of Medicine in Rio in 1905 to promote formal academic and 
informal political networks (Dumont, 2010, p. 4), the potential political opportunities of 
academic cooperation are apparently unknown to Brazil’s contemporary policy makers. As 
Ziguras points out, “to aspire to an education system outside the influence of power is to 
overlook the fundamental ways in which the configurations of power within every society 
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shape its valuing of particular forms of knowledge and its systems of learning” (Ziguras, 
2018, p.183); it is an obvious choice for governments to internationally capitalize on their 
HE systems. 
But to assign responsibility, the question remains: who is in charge of foreign policy 
strategy in Brazil? Formally, this authority lies in the remit of Itamaraty. However, in this 
case, the concrete design, structuring, and implementation is being carried out under the 
auspices of MEC and MCTI. This lack of streamlining political strategy lays bare the central 
deficit of CsF in realizing its soft power potential, particularly since neither MEC nor MCTI 
have significant influence or interest in developing the strategy of foreign policy (Miranda 
and Bischoff, 2018, p.906). 
Due primarily to the size of the program, CsF might be regarded as a significant 
source of soft power. The lack of political coordination in operating the program and its core 
focus on the natural sciences, however, suggest that the program is squarely aimed at 
national capacity building in the spirit of the developmental state, which Brazil is often 
described as (Schneider, 1999). 
CsF did not seem to strategically support foreign policy goals, nor did it appear to be 
concerned with building a network of future political and societal leaders that might have 
been beneficial assets to Brazil’s international posture. In fact, according to Miranda and 
Bischoff, the idea of CsF was spun out of the first meeting between then President of the 
United States, Barack Obama, and Dilma Rousseff, (Miranda and Bischoff, 2018, p.911) and 
therefore might even be understood as a result of American soft power in action. 
As the then Brazilian Minister of State for Culture, Marta Suplicy, made clear in a 
speech given at a Wilton Park conference in 2013 (Wilton Park, 2013), Brazilian leadership 
understands that capacity building abroad can lead to soft power, as researchers gain a 
better understanding of the functioning of other cultures and can thereby advise Brazil’s 
external action (Suplicy, 2013). Why, then, do policy makers fail to adjust existing structures 
to fully serve such a strategy? In the context of the future direction of Brazilian foreign 
policy, it seems that CsF was not strategically set-up and used as a resource of soft power. 
The decision to introduce a general fund for academic exchange and decentralize the 
decision-making, rather than to steer the process from Itamaraty or the Presidency via e.g. 
bilateral agreements with partnering countries, lowered the leverage that political 
negotiation was able to have on the geopolitical orientation of the program. 
Furthermore, by focusing on natural sciences rather than humanities or social 
sciences, the program suggests that the future political leaders of Brazilian society are not 
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explicit targets. Instead, the program focused on the base of future economic growth within 
the country: highly-skilled workers.  
The fact that Itamaraty is not directly involved in the program shows a lack of 
leadership for maintaining influential policy networks, which in the mid- to long-term could 
serve the purpose of efficiently translating soft power resources that have been gained 
through the program into useable assets. A lack of understanding of the value of 
international education as a source of soft power, both at the presidential level as well as in 
Itamaraty, may serve to explain the sub-utilization of CsF for soft power purposes (Miranda 
and Bischoff, 2018, p.912). 
Drawing from the example of Germany’s DAAD, it becomes clear that had CsF been 
structured differently, the Brazilian government might have gained more from the 
beneficial side effects of soft power. In particular, the comparison highlighted the 
importance of embedding program coordination more deeply within government 
ministries, such as Itamaraty. Conversely, bringing such a program into broader foreign 
policy strategy allows it to serve beyond domestic developmentalism. Furthermore, DAAD 
demonstrated the value of targeting both incoming students and future “leaders” from a 
wider range of disciplines, as well as organizing a longer-term strategy through alumni 
networks. Finally, the public diplomacy and public relations dimension of such soft power 
efforts cannot be underestimated. In this sense, a stronger focus on the societal outreach and 
impact of the recipients of scholarships, alongside dedicated advertising, is shown to enable 
exchange programs to attract interest beyond the domestic academic bubble. 
The question remains as to why Brazilian politics would turn away from a policy tool 
that had been part of Brazil’s diplomatic tradition (Saraiva, 2014) and instituted by one of 
Brazil’s most highly acclaimed politicians, Baron de Rio Branco. There are two possible, non-
exclusive approaches to this question. The first is that soft power was poorly executed. Since 
it is unlikely that the Brazilian government simply forgot about the importance of academic 
exchange for soft power policies, one might argue that the CsF program was regarded as 
soft power resource within the government. Some officials might join former Brazilian 
diplomat Ribeiro Couto in arguing that the “purpose [was] to set the basis for a discreet 
propaganda of Brazilian intellectual values abroad, avoiding, as much as possible, that these 
endeavors should be perceived as an ostentatious official propaganda” (Dumont, 2010, p.5). 
However, the fact that a positive influence can barely be measured, and that neither the 
president nor the foreign ministry is involved in the program, make it extremely difficult to 
consider this a coordinated policy measure – which is not an unthinkable scenario in the 
Brazilian political arena.  
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The second approach focuses on the developmental state. It could also be argued that, 
as with other policy areas, Brazil has shown the tendency to neglect its heritage of successful 
soft power interventions as its economy grows and its hard power resources increase. The 
political management of CsF could serve as a further indicator of this development focus, 
as the Brazilian government turns to measurable gains in science output (e.g. innovation 
and patents), and transferring knowledge towards its own economy rather than the 
sometimes difficult to quantify soft power gains and their respective translation into 
political influence.  
With the last scholarships awarded in 2015, Ciência sem Fronteiras remains one of 
the largest academic exchange programs of recent history. With the financial crisis of 2015, 
and its ensuing political turmoil, Brazil also faced (and still faces) a notable decline in its soft 
power reservoir. With a stronger vision of actively creating soft power through CsF, the 
country’s perception might not have suffered to such a degree. Future Brazilian 
governments might re-design academic exchange programs in a fashion that allows the 
country to strategically position itself as a leading soft power – again. 
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